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Risk Assessment for the Ribe Area
COMRISK Subproject 7
THORSTEN PIONTKOWITZ, ANDREAS KORTENHAUS, HOCINE OUMERACI
S umm a r y
Within COMRISK subproject SP7, a risk assessment of the coastal defence system in Ribe/
Denmark has been performed based on the state-of-the-art of flood risk analysis methods. The
flood risk has been defined as the product of the flooding probability and the expected con-
sequences of flooding. This paper describes the detailed hazard analysis by which the overall
flooding probability of the Ribe defence system has been achieved. Results of sensitivity analyses
regarding the assessment of uncertainties for input parameters and models used, the considera-
tion of other special constructions such as one sluice and three outlets as well as an approach
of dividing the defence system into ‘homogenous’ sections with respect to governing load and
resistance parameters are also described.
Furthermore, the paper provides information about the vulnerability analysis, which has
been performed to evaluate the consequences in case of flooding. Relevant damage categories,
comprising vulnerable assets or non-material values, have been selected and valued together with
the derivation of depth-damage functions for each damage category. Seven breach and inunda-
tion scenarios have been defined to assess the range of expected damage due to flooding in the
flood prone area. Finally, risk values have been assessed.
Z u s a mm e n f a s s u n g
Innerhalb des siebten Teilprojekts von COMRISK wurde eine Risikoanalyse des Hoch-
wasser- und Küstenschutzsystems (HuK-System) in Ribe/Dänemark durchgeführt. Das Über-
flutungsrisiko wurde hierbei definiert als das Produkt aus Versagenswahrscheinlichkeit des
HuK-Systems und dem zu erwartenden potenziellen Schaden im Falle einer Überflutung. Dieser
Beitrag beschreibt zunächst die detaillierte Gefahrenanalyse mit der die Gesamtversagenswahr-
scheinlichkeit des HuK-Systems in Ribe ermittelt wurde. Die Ergebnisse einer Sensitivitätsana-
lyse bezüglich der Abschätzung von Unsicherheiten der Eingangsparameter und Modelle, die
Berücksichtigung von Sonderbauwerken (eine Schleuse und drei Auslässe), sowie die Einteilung
des HuK-Systems in ,homogene‘ Abschnitte abhängig vonmaßgebenden Belastungs- undWider-
standsparametern werden ebenfalls beschrieben.
Zusätzlich wird die Vulnerabilitätsanalyse beschrieben, die durchgeführt wurde um die be-
drohten Werte und die potenzielle Schädigung im Untersuchungsgebiet abzuschätzen. Hierzu
wurden maßgebende Schadenskategorien, die Vermögensobjekte oder nicht materielle Werte
umfassten, ausgewählt und Schadensfunktionen für jede Schadenskategorie hergeleitet. Sieben
Versagens- und Überflutungsszenarien wurden definiert, um die Größenordnung des durch
Überflutung verursachten potenziellen Schadens ermitteln zu können. Abschließend wurden
szenarienabhängige Risiken bestimmt und beurteilt.
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1. I n t r o d u c t i o n
More than 16 million people, corresponding to approx. 20 % of the total population in
theNorth Sea region, live in coastal lowlands. Major economic activities, such as the seaports
of Rotterdam, London andHamburg or the tourist industry, have been increasingly concen-
trated in coastal regions over the last centuries. In addition, storm surges have increased over
the last decades, both in frequency and intensity, increasing the hazard to the coastal regions.
This has led to an increase of vulnerability to natural hazards within these regions.
Defence structures (e.g. sea dikes) to protect the flood prone areas have been designed
by means of purely deterministic approaches or based on experience. Due to decreasing
resources and increasing costs it is more and more desirable to optimise the cost-benefit-
ratio for these structures (OUMERACI, 2004). Within the COMRISK subproject SP7, a risk
assessment of the coastal defence system in Ribe/Denmark has been performed based on the
state-of-the-art of flood risk analysis methods. The overall flooding risk has been defined as
the product of the flooding probability Pf and the expected consequences of flooding E(D).
The study has been performed in two major steps which comprises (I) the hazard ana-
lysis (calculation of the overall flooding probability) and the (II) the vulnerability analysis
evaluating the expected consequences of flooding. Latter has been performed by the Danish
Coastal Authority (DCA), being responsible for subproject SP7. The hazard analysis has
been carried out together with the Leichtweiß-Institute for Hydraulic Engineering at the
Technical University Braunschweig, Germany.
The overall aim of this paper is to describe the risk analysis of the Ribe area. For this
purpose, the defence system and its components, the input parameters and their uncertainties
as well as the limit state equations (LSE) and the probabilistic calculations will be described.
Damage categories applied within the vulnerability analysis will be listed and their valuation
will be explained togetherwith the derivation of the depth-damage functions for each damage
category. Seven breach and inundation scenarios are defined to assess the range of expected
damage due to flooding in the flood prone area. Finally, the overall results will be critically
discussed and remarks for future developments will be given.
2. C o a s t a l D e f e n c e S y s t e m i n R i b e
The Ribe defence system is located about 50 km north of the German-Danish border at
the Wadden Sea coast protecting approximately 95 km2 low-lying flat marsh land surroun-
ding Ribe town. Ribe is the oldest town in Denmark with about 9000 inhabitants. Three
streams and a large river, Ribe Å, cross the flat marshland on their way towards their mouths
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(see Fig. 1). The river flows through Ribe town and passes a sluice shortly before reaching
its mouth. The three streams pass the defence line through three outlets.
In this way, the 15.3 km long defence line consists of a main dike structure, a sluice
and three outlets. The main dike is characterised by a sand core and a clay/grass cover. The
standard profile shows a 1:10 seaward slope and a crown height of 6.88 mDVR90. The stan-
dard cross section and the key geometric parameters are shown in Fig. 2. The dike structure,
the sluice and outlets are described in more detail in OUMERACI et al. (2004) and DANISH
COASTAL AUTHORITY (2004).
Fig. 1: Map of the Ribe flood defence system
Fig. 2: Standard cross-section of the main dike in Ribe (km 6,644 as an example)
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3. H a z a r d a n a l y s i s
For the deterministic and probabilistic calculationswithin the hazard analysis, themodel
by Kortenhaus (2003) for sea dikes has been used. It comprises 25 failure mechanisms with
a total number of 87 input parameters. The input parameters were grouped into parameters
describing (I) the geometry of the structure, (II) the hydromechanic boundary conditions,
and (III) the geotechnical properties of the structure.
3.1 I n p u t p a r a m e t e r s
I. Geometrical parameters
Topographic measurements were available for six cross sections along the main dike
line which were regarded as the weakest points of the main dike. Thus, it was concluded that
analysing these profiles would account for the potential weak spots of the dike.
The crest heights of themain dike were taken from availablemeasurements performed in
different years. The dimensions and constructional details of the sluice and the outlets were
taken from technical drawings which were made available by the DCA.
II. Hydraulic boundary conditions
The design water level for all cross sections, the sluice and the outlets is a pre-described
value which was determined from measurements at the Danish coast. It is defined as hw =
5.22 m for a 200-year return period.
The input parameters for wave height andwave periods resulted from a study performed
by Danish Hydraulic Institute (DHI). The offshore input parameters for this study were
given by DCA so that 21 simulations with different input parameters were performed. The
results of these runs are given as wave heights Hm0 and wave periods Tm for specific points
along the coastline (100 m distance) for water depths corresponding to 50 m and 300 m dis-
tance to the toe of the dike, respectively.
Angles of wave attack were based on instructions given by the DCA and corresponded
to the most unfavourable conditions for the specific cross sections. The duration of design
storm surge was assumed to be constant as ts = 6.5 h.
III. Geotechnical parameters
All geotechnical parameters like the shear strength of the clay were predefined by the
DCA. This information was based on geotechnical investigations which were performed
close to the six cross sections during reinforcement works in 1980.
3.2 D e t e r m i n i s t i c c a l c u l a t i o n s
3.2.1 L i m i t s t a t e e q u a t i o n s
For deterministic calculations of the dike sections a total number of 23 failure mecha-
nisms were considered. Due to the lack of stone revetments at the Ribe main dike all failure
mechanisms associated with stone revetments were not considered for the calculations. Fig. 3
gives an overview of failure mechanisms of a sea dike considered in the method by KORTEN-
HAUS (2003).
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For deterministic calculations of the sluice, the failuremechanismsdescribed inKORTEN-
HAUS (2003) could not be used. Therefore, OUMERACI et al. (2004) have formulated further
limit state equations (LSE) describing e.g. the stability of the gates, piping underneath the
sluice, wave overtopping over the gates and human error.
The failure mechanisms for the Ribe outlets are a combination of the failure mechanisms
for the sluice and those for the dike sections. This combination was chosen since the outlets
are partly sluices (walls, gates, etc.) but also show the characteristics of a dike (slope, grass
cover, crest, etc.). Details of this approach are described in OUMERACI et al. (2004).
3.2.2 C a l c u l a t i o n o f d i k e s e c t i o n s
A deterministic calculation for all failure mechanisms described in section 3.2.1 was
performed for all six dike sections showing that the failure mode “erosion of grass cover at
the seaward side” will lead to failure for all cross sections. This means that for a design water
level of hw = 5.22m and a storm surge duration of ts = 6.5 h the grass cover both at the seaward
and shoreward side of the dike will fail.
3.2.3 C a l c u l a t i o n s f o r s l u i c e a n d o u t l e t s
The results of the deterministic calculation of the sluice and the outlets showed that there
is failure for the LSE “wave overtopping” under design conditions. Consequently, there is
also a total failure (inundation of flood prone areas) for the sluice and the outlets. The safety
coefficients for wave overtopping and overflow are significantly lower as compared to the
dike cross sections. A reason for this observation is that the seaward slope is much steeper
in the case of the outlets. Furthermore, the water depth in front of the structures is signifi-
cantly larger (up to 5.0 m) than in front of the dikes, thus allowing higher waves to occur at
the structures.
Fig. 3: Overview of failure mechanisms of a sea dike considered in the method after KORTENHAUS (2003)
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3.3 U n c e r t a i n t y o f i n p u t p a r a m e t e r s
Uncertainties indicate the variation of parameters around their mean values. They can
be estimated using either a full statistical distribution or a mean value and a standard devi-
ation assuming a Normal distribution. For some parameters, which were considered to be
important for the failure mechanisms (a sensitivity analysis was performed beforehand), the
uncertainties were evaluated in more detail (water level, dike height, wave height and wave
period, geotechnical parameters, model uncertainties). Tab. 1 shows the results of the uncer-
tainty evaluations used in this study.
3.4 P r o b a b i l i s t i c c a l c u l a t i o n s
In a first step, the failure probability Pf of each mechanism was determined. Level II
(FORM) or Level III (Monte Carlo Simulation) calculations were performed depending
on the complexity of the limit state equations. The calculated failure probability is given as
Pf/year. Failure probabilities smaller than Pf = 1 · 10
–10 were taken as Pf · 0 and were ignored
for subsequent calculations.
To calculate the temporal dependencies of the failure mechanisms, a scenario approach
proposed by KORTENHAUS (2003) was used. In the scenario approach, the chronology of
time-dependent failure mechanisms was achieved by defining “scenario blocks”, which com-
prise several individual failure mechanisms in logical and temporal order.
3.4.1 C a l c u l a t i o n o f d i k e s e c t i o n s
In Tab. 2 an overview of all results for the probabilistic calculation of all dike cross
sections and all individual failure mechanisms is given. The failure probability for breaching
is extremely high since the LSE does not consider the temporal development of the erosion
process. The same missing temporal dependency accounts for the failure mechanism ‘grass
erosion seaward slope’. The very high failure probability does not have a significant impor-
tance for the overall failure probability since it only represents the start of the erosion process
at the seaward slope.
Therefore, in the following the results of the calculation for a scenario approach (inc.
temporal relations between failure mech.) and the related fault tree analysis will be discus-
sed.
Parameter Uncertainty Restriction Remarks
Crown heigh hk Sdev = 0,10 m – Uncertainty in measurements
Water level hw Sdev = 0,47 m – Extreme statistics from available
measurements
Wave heigh Hs CoV Hs = 0,55*d Breaker criterin, d = local water
depth
Wave period Tp CoV = 0,20 Tp = (Hs/0,0938)^0.5 Restriction by wave steepness
Tab. 1: Overview of uncertainties of most relevant parameters
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A simplified ‘scenario fault tree’ for dike cross section km 8,422, ignoring all branches
in the fault tree with Pf < 10
–10, is shown in Fig. 4. The failure probabilities for the scenarios
were calculated using the Level III approach (Monte-Carlo simulation). The results are sum-
marised in Tab. 3.
Tab. 2: Overview of failure probabilities for all failure modes of all dike cross sections
No. Failure mechanism Dike section
3156 6644 8422 9400 10403 14499
Global failure mechanisms
1 Overflow 1,0E-06 2,0E-07 2,3E-06 1,0E-0,6 3,4E-06 5,0E-07
2 Wave overtopping 3,0E-05 0,0E-06 4,1E-05 3,5E-05 6,6E-05 9,0E-06
3 Breaching 4,3E-02 1,8E-02 7,4E-02 4,2E-02 8,9E-02 3,6E-02
4 Sliding 3,4E-07 3,3E-07 4,1E-07 3,3E-07 3,5E-07 3,4E-07
Failure mechanisms at the seaward slope of the dike
6 Impact 8,0E-06 5,0E-06 2,0E-06 4,0E-06 7,0E-06 8,0E-06
8 Velocity seaward slope 2,2E-02 1,8E-02 3,4E-02 1,9E-02 3,4E-02 3,2E-02
9 Crass erosion seaward slope 2,9E-01 2,4E-01 6,8E-01 2,6E-01 3,3E-01 3,0E-01
10 Clay erosion seaward slope 1,3E-05 5,6E-05 3,6E-05 1,3E-05 3,7E-05 4,6E-05
11 Erosion dike core seaward
slope
1,7E-05 7,6E-05 4,8E-04 1,1E-04 3,2E-04 5,6E-04
12 Stability seaward slope 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Failure mechanisms at the shoreward slope of the dike
13 Velocity overflow 2,0E-06 3,0E-06 3,0E-06 2,0E-06 2,0E-06 0,0E+00
14 Velocity wave overtopping 2,6E-05 3,3E-05 1,4E-04 1,2E-05 1,9E-04 2,2E-05
15 Grass erosion shoreward
slope
1,6E-04 1,0E-04 5,7E-04 8,5E-05 6,9E-04 1,2E-04
16 Clay erosion shoreward
slope
6,3E-05 1,6E-05 6,6E-05 2,3E-05 7,6E-05 1,7E-05
17 Infiltration 0,0 8,0E-06 2,1E-04 1,0E-06 0,0E+00 1,6E-04
18 Kappensturz 1,4E-02 1,1E-02 7,6E-03 2,3E-02 4,1E-03 1,4E-02
19 Seepage 1,0E-06 1,0E-06 1,0E-06 2,0E-06 0,0E+00 1,0E-06
20 Uplift clay on shoreward
slope
1,0E-06 2,0E-06 1,0E-06 1,0E-06 0,0E-06 0,0+00
21 Sliding clay shoreward slope 4,1E-04 5,4E-04 1,4E-04 1,3E-03 1,4E-03 2,4E-04
22 Stability shoreward slope 0,0 0,0 9,6E-05 0,0 0,0 0,0
23 Erosion dike shoreward
slope
0,0 0,0 3,2E-05 3,0E-06 7,0E-06 0,0
Failure mechanisms in the dike
24 Piping 9,6E-07 2,0E-06 2,0E-06 6,8E-07 1,1E-06 5,4E-7
25 Matrix erosion 2,5E-01 1,4E-01 2,7E-02 2,6E-02 3,8E-03 2,8E-04
Overall failure 3,1E-05 9,2E-06 4,3E-05 3,6E-05 6,9E-05 9,5E-06
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For most of the scenarios the overall failure probability resulted in Pf · 0. Scenario I
comprises the grass erosion, the clay erosion, the cliff erosion and the breaching of the dike
and Scenario I + II (cliff erosion and breaching) result in failure probabilities larger than
Pf = 1 · 10
–10. For cross section km 8,422, Scenario I gives Pf = 3.5 · 10
–5. In comparison to the
traditional fault tree approach where temporal relations of the failure modes are not consi-
dered sufficiently, the failure probability for the seaward side of the dike was Pf ~ 5 · 10
–8, i.e.
three orders of magnitude smaller.
The increased failure probability for the seaward slope including the grass erosion now
comesmuch closer to the failure probability for wave overtopping so that the erosion process
gets increasingly important for dikes investigated here.
Overall, the flooding probabilities using the scenario approach results in 3–5 % higher
values for four cross sections (6644, 8422, 9400 and 10409). All other cross sections do not
seem to be affected by the use of a scenario approach. This result is only valid for the Ribe
case since the failure probability for wave overtopping is rather high in this case.
The influence of mean values of some key input parameters on the failure probability of
individual mechanisms, scenarios and the overall flooding probability has been investigated.
An increase, for example, of the mean water level hw by 0.50 m yields an increase of the fai-
lure probability for wave overtopping by a factor of 10 and a reduction by 0.50 m results in
a lower failure probability by a factor of 10. The overall flooding probability is changed by
the same order of magnitude. Moreover, the influence of mean values of further parameters
on the failure probability for wave overtopping was investigated in detail (wave overtopping
was selected since it has the largest influence on the overall flooding probability). In this
connection, the key parameters, which affect the failure probability for wave overtopping
and the overall flooding probability most, were determined as the water level and the wave
period. Uncertainties for both parameters should therefore be evaluated very carefully.
Tab. 3: Failure probability of scenarios for all dike cross sections of the Ribe sea defence
Individual
mechanisms
Dike cross section
No. (see Tab. 4–7 for def.) 3156 6644 8422 9400 10403 14499
Sc 1 9+10+11+3 3,0E-06 6,0E-06 3,5E-05 1,4E-05 3,4E-05 7,0E-06
Sc 2 11+3 3,0E-05 2,6E-04 1,1E-03 6,9E-05 4,9E-04 7,7E-04
Sc 3 15+16+18+3 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sc 4 17+21+18+3 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sc 5 19+20+21+18+3 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sc 6 15+16+23+3 0 0 1,5E-05 0 4,0E-06 0
Sc 7 17+21+23+3 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sc 8 19+20+21+23+3 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sc 9 23+3 0 0 3,8E-05 0 9,0E-06 0
Sc 10 19+24+23+3 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sc 11 19+25+23+3 0 0 0 0 0 0
Overall failure 3,10E-05 9,6E-06 4,50E-05 3,70E-05 7,10E-05 1,00E-05
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3.4.2 C a l c u l a t i o n o f t h e R i b e s l u i c e a n d o u t l e t s
The failure probability of the Ribe sluice and the outlets was calculated using theMonte-
Carlo method. The results are shown in Tab. 4.
The failure probabilities for the outlets are all in the range of Pf · 5·10–1, which means
that flooding occurs once every 2 years, approximately.
Calculations showed, that the key failure mechanism for all structures is wave overtop-
ping where a tolerable wave overtopping rate of qtol = 20 l/(sm) has been assumed. Variations
of the tolerable overtopping rates (qtol = 100 l/(sm), 200 l/(sm) and 515 l/(sm) where the latter
corresponds to the overtopping rate for zero free-board as the maximum possible value were
performed to study its influence on the results.
Increasing the tolerable wave overtopping rate to 100 l/(sm) and 200 l/(sm) results in
a decrease of the failure probability for wave overtopping by a factor of about 10 and 100
for all outlets and the sluice, respectively. If the tolerable wave overtopping rate is set to 515
l/(sm), the failure probability for wave overtopping will be in the range of 10–4 for the sluice
and 10–5 or 10–6 for the outlets.
3.5 F a i l u r e p r o b a b i l i t y o f f l o o d d e f e n c e s y s t e m
In order to determine the overall flooding probability of the Ribe defence system, a
division into several dike sections was made. The division into several dike sections assu-
med for one section very small variation of the input parameters for either the stress or the
resistance of the limit state equations. The crown height hk of the dike and the peak wave
period Tp were finally selected as the key criteria for the division of the defence system into
‘homogenous’ dike sections.
In all, 15 sections were defined as shown in Fig. 5. Four sections were defined to be close
to section km 6,644, two sections close to km 14,499 whereas all other sections differ from
each other. Section 4 in Fig. 5 could not be assigned to one of the investigated cross-sections
since the crest height hk = 7.53 m was significantly higher than for the other sections. This
section was ignored for the subsequent probabilistic calculation. The sluice and the three
outlets were defined as separate sections.
The failure probabilities of all sections (dike sections, sluice outlets) were linked to each
other by means of a fault tree with just one OR gate, which was used to calculate the overall
flooding probability of the hinterland.
Tab. 4: Results of probabilistic calculations for the sluice and the three outlets
(selected failure mechanisms)
No. Failure mechanisms Kammer Outlets
sluice V.Vedsted Konge Å Darum
1 Overflow 5,3 E-02 1,5E-04 2,5E-04 7,9E-05
2 Wave overtopping 6,1E-01 5,6E-01 4,7E-01 4,9E-01
3 Hydraulic heave 1,0E-10 1,0E-10 1,0E-10 1,0E-10
4 Gates not closed 1,2E-03 1,0E-04 1,0E-04 1,0E-04
Overall failure 6,3E-01 5,6E-01 4,7E-01 4,9E-01
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The fault tree calculations including all sections resulted in an overall flooding proba-
bility of Pf = 9.5 · 10
–1. This result was considered to be much too high since it solely de-
pends on the failure probabilities of the sluice and the outlets which are mainly governed by
wave overtopping. Due to small inflow volumes during wave overtopping (limited stretch
of sluice/outlets), a second calculation ignoring sluice and the outlets resulted in an overall
flooding probability of Pf = 2.5 · 10
–4.
Despite the fact that the sluice and the outlets are very narrow structures, calculations
showed that the sluice and the outlets are the weakest elements in the defence line. An ex-
ample calculation showed that flooding from wave overtopping over the sluice would result
in a water level in the flood prone area of less than 1 mm only. However, structural failure of
the sluice or one of the outlets would cause major flooding of the hinterland. It is therefore
essential to investigate the sluice and the outlets in more detail to finally determine the overall
flooding probability. For the time being it is recommended to use a flooding probability of
Pf = 2.5 · 10
–4 for the flood defence system in Ribe.
4. V u l n e r a b i l i t y a n a l y s i s
As cartographic basis for the vulnerability analysis, altitude data in a grid net of 25x25
metres was used to generate a topographical map of the flood-prone area, being delimited
by the 5.0 m DVR90 altitude line. The altitude data was supplemented by altitude data from
road surveys. Fig. 6 presents the topography of theRibe flood-prone area, showing low-lying
delta areas surrounding the watercourses far into the hinterland.
Fig. 5: Division of the Ribe flood defence system into representative sections
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4.1 D am a g e c a t e g o r i e s a n d d a t a s o u r c e s
Within the flood-prone area of Ribe six categories of direct, tangible damage were selec-
ted (buildings, movable property, agricultural acreage, livestock, electric installations, traffic
system). Additionally, four damage categories (inhabitants, employees, vehicles, tourism)
subject to intangible, direct/indirect damage were considered in a descriptive form. Typi-
cally, data was available at national registers, such as the Building and Housing register or
the Central Livestock register. In other cases, data was provided by research centres or the
responsible county. The request of data from national registers or public administrations
about the damage categories showed however clear differences in data quality and format.
This fact complicated the procedure of geocoding each risk element by means of a GIS soft-
ware application.
Fig. 6: Topography of the Ribe flood-prone area
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4.2 V a l u a t i o n a n a l y s i s
The valuation analysis showed the location of most of the assets on high ground around
the low-lying delta area of Ribe River. For example, only 7 % of the accumulated property
value is located below 2.5 m DVR90. About 45 % of the accumulated property value is
placed below 4.0 m DVR90 and about 30 % of the total property value is located between
4.5 and 5.0 m DVR90. Fig. 6 illustrates the total property value of buildings distributed over
ten altitude intervals.
This distribution of assets over altitude has been characteristic for most of the damage
categories. However, a differentiation of the total profit of all kinds of crop over altitude
showed an almost linear distribution, which differed remarkably from the other damage
categories.
4.3 D am a g e a n a l y s i s a n d i n u n d a t i o n s c e n a r i o s
To determine the possible damage for each damage category, seven breach and overtop-
ping scenarios were defined. In five scenarios inundation occurs due to one or more dike
breaches, whereas two scenarios consider wave overtopping and the structural failure of
both gates of the sluice, respectively. The seven scenarios are defined as follows (sections as
referred to in Fig. 5):
Sc1: one dike breach in section 6
Sc2: one dike breach in section 2
Fig. 7: Total property value distributed over altitude intervals
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Sc3: one dike breach in section 9
Sc4: wave overtopping in section 9
Sc5: three dike breaches in sections 2, 6, and 9
Sc6: four dike breaches in sections 2, 6, 8, and 9
Sc7: failure of both gates at the sluice
Depth-damage functions were derived for each damage category where the damage de-
pends on the inundation depth. In case of depth-independent damage, damage factors were
derived to quantify the damage.
For buildings and movable property depth-damage functions could be derived from
data about compensation payments regarding real flood damage to buildings and movable
property inDenmark. The assessment of flood damage to agricultural acreage was performed
by external experts. Their assessment comprised damage factors for different kinds of crop
and inundation periods of 5, 14 and 28 days.
Based on the seven scenarios, inflow volumes between 0.5 and 127 million m3 were
calculated. Input parameters, such as a standardised storm surge hydrograph, the failure
probability of defence system sections, the time-dependent development of a dike breach
as well as an assumed time of failure during storm surge were considered in the calculations
of the inflow volumes. Based on these input parameters, the flood-prone area is differently
inundated depending on the location and the number of failure events.
Due to differences in inundation behaviour, damage within each scenario varies between
1.15 and 424.5 million DKK (56.9 million Ð). Only the scenarios Sc5 and Sc6 resulted in da-
mage exceeding 100 million DKK (13.4 million Ð). The scenarios Sc1, Sc2 and Sc7 showed
comparable inundation behaviour and resulted in the same total damage for all three scena-
rios. Tab. 5 gives the final results of the calculated damage for the seven scenarios.
Tab. 5: The calculated damage for all inundation scenarios (‘trafic system’ and ‘elec. installations’
have been grouped together as ‘infrastructure’
Risk
element
Sc1/Sc2/Sc7 Sc3 Sc4 Sc5 Sc6
Buildings DKK 4.937.000 DKK 0 DKK 0 DKK 54.179.000 DKK 203.555.00
€ 662.685 € 0 € 0 € 7.272.349 € 27.322.819
Movable
proberty
DKK 4.640.000 DKK 0 DKK 0 DKK 37.538.000 DKK 146.905.000
€ 622.819 € 0 € 0 € 5.038.658 € 19.718.792
Agricultural
acreages
DKK 2.208.000 DKK 933.000 DKK 211.000 DKK 7.098.000 DKK 9.489.000
January € 296.376 € 125.235 € 28.322 € 952.752 € 1.273.691
Livestock DKK 0 DKK 0 DKK 0 DKK 1.232.500 DKK 7.978.000
€ 0 € € 0 € 165.436 € 1.070.872
Infra-
structure
DKK 7.226.000 DKK 844.000 DKK 942.500 DKK 22.862.000 DKK 56.554.000
€ 969.933 € 113.289 € 126.510 € 3.068.725 € 7.591.141
Total DKK 19.011.00 DKK 1.777.000 DKK 1.153.500 DKK 122.909.500 DKK 424.481.000
€ 2.551.812 € 238.523 € 154.832 € 16.497.919 € 56.977.315
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5. R i s k a s s e s s m e n t
Finally, risk values were calculated varying between 300 DKK/year and 110.000 DKK/
year. In this connection, the risk values calculated for scenarios Sc3 and Sc4 represent the
lower bound of risk values for the Ribe flood defence system. On the other hand, the upper
bound is represented by the risk value based on scenario Sc6.
The risk assessment made clear that the range of risk values depends on the inundation
scenarios and the damage, whichwas determined on the basis of the inundation extension and
depth. The determination of these factors required several assumptions, such as the location
and number of failure events, the time of failure, the water level at the time of failure and a
standardised storm surge hydrograph.
The aforementioned assumptions were not analysed within the damage analysis, as, for
example, the location and number of dike breaches was chosen mainly on the basis of the
overall failure probabilities calculated for the dike sections of the defence system.
6. C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
The aim of this study was to analyse the overall risk of the flood-prone area in Ribe/
Denmark. A hazard analysis has been performed as part of determining the flooding pro-
bability. The probabilistic calculations resulted in a failure probability of Pf = 1 · 10
–5 to
Pf = 1 ·10
–6 for the dike sections. Similar values were obtained when scenario fault trees were
used because the overall flooding probability is primarily governed by the failure probability
of wave overtopping. The failure probability of the sluice and the outlets were in the range of
Pf = 1 · 10–1 which was mainly due to the high failure probability for wave overtopping.
In order to determine the overall flooding probability, the defence system was divided
into 15 sections. The division was based on two selection criteria, the structure type and the
input parameters. Regarding the latter the wave period Tp and the crest height hk were most
relevant. The fault tree calculations only considering the dike sections (without sluice and
outlets) resulted in Pf= 2.5 · 10
–4. However, this simple approach of dividing a defence system
into sections has to be further developed in future, prompted by the following objectives:
– The variation of the relevant input parameters along the defence system (length effect)
has to be considered. Wave attack on the seaward slope may vary locally because of chan-
ging the foreshore geometry. Furthermore, a varying crest height due to consolidation
of different magnitude along the defence system may influence the probability of wave
overtopping.
– The variation of input parameters along the defence system has to be considered in the pro-
babilistic calculations in order to obtain a more accurate overall flooding probability of the
defence system. In this respect, spatial and temporal correlations between different defence
structures (dike, sluice, foreshore etc.) within one defence system have to be considered.
– Moreover, an improved approach of considering the parameter variation and dependen-
cies (length effect) will give reliability-based indications of the location of failure (dike
breach) along the defence line, which will be crucial in the process of defining inundation
scenarios.
Due to the high failure probability of the sluice and the outlets, it was concluded
that the sluice and the outlets represent the weak points of the Ribe flood defence system.
Nevertheless, calculations showed that the limit-state equations and the uncertainty of the
input parameters concerning sluices and outlets require further investigations. This goes
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along with a more accurate estimation of the real wave height and wave period in front of
sluices and outlets.Within the vulnerability analysis only few damage categories have been
considered. For some damage categories the tangible property was difficult to assess. How-
ever, the vulnerability analysis showed that the total damage calculated within each scenario
strongly depends on the definition of the scenarios, the considered damage categories, the
determination of the inundation behaviour and the derived depth-damage functions. There-
fore, further investigations on the following topics should be carried out:
• criteria for the definition of inundation scenarios;
• damage categories, which have not been considered in this study;
• determination of the inundation process, e.g. by using numerical modelling;
• understanding of the breaching process of a clay-covered dike and the flood inundation
process;
• further development of the depth-damage functions and their verification by real data.
Despite these further investigations, the assessment of the inundation propagation and
thus the dimension of the damage are only assessable to a certain degree of accuracy. How-
ever, to calculate the flood risk and to assess the importance of the flood defence system as
a defence structure for the inhabitants and their assets, a vulnerability analysis is indispens-
able.
The presented risk analysis procedure has been considered as starting point of reliabi-
lity-based design of flood defence systems. This study has shown that it is indeed possible
to consider more stochastic parameters when analysing the safety of a flood defence system.
Despite the fact that many questions are still open and problems regarding the feasibility
remain unsolved, the risk analysis procedure has resulted in a considerable increase in infor-
mation about the Ribe flood defence system and the protected hinterland, which certainly
will contribute to improve the decision-making regarding future flood defence systems in
the area.
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